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ABSTRACT
Team Policing Revisited: A Quasi-Experimental
Evaluation in Las Vegas, Nevada
by
Natalie Nicole Martinez
Dr. William H. Sousa, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice recommended team policing, which involves the decentralization of patrol
officers and investigators to the same, defined geographical area, as a way to more
effectively organize police officers and improve crime control. Despite initial enthusiasm
from police officers and administrators, team policing quickly faded from use during the
1970s because its design was incompatible with the centralized model of policing
prevalent at that time. However, the implementation of community-oriented policing,
which promotes various organizational changes and the use of problem-focused strategies,
has changed police departments in recent years and in many ways that complement the
use of team policing, thus allowing it a better chance to succeed. In March 2012, the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department implemented its own version of team policing,
which incorporates community-oriented, problem-oriented, and hot spots policing
strategies in an effort to reduce crime and disorder in a local neighborhood. This study
evaluates the impact of team policing in that neighborhood, discusses the limitations of
the research design and data, and provides suggestions for future research on team
policing.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Though the purpose of the police in America – to protect and serve the public –
has remained unchanged throughout its history, policing strategies have transformed in
various ways. Police reforms have focused on improving the organizational structure and
redefining the responsibilities of the police within the communities they serve. Early
reforms sought to increase police efficiency and remove potential sources of corruption
by creating a rigid and hierarchical centralized command structure and removing
neighborhood and political influences. Recent reforms aim to improve policing by
promoting physical and command decentralization, increased communication between
officers, and community involvement in crime control and prevention.
Originating in the late 1970s, the most recent major police reform has been the
implementation of community-oriented policing. Community-oriented policing is a
multi-faceted approach which promotes organizational changes that both encourage
community participation in crime control and prevention and incorporate problemsolving strategies in routine police work to resolve the underlying causes of crime,
disorder, and fear of crime (Scheider, Chapman, & Shapiro, 2009). Community-oriented
policing promotes policing strategies that are much different from traditional strategies.
Whereas in a traditional centralized command the decision-making authority is reserved
for police administrators, community-oriented policing requires that greater decisionmaking authority be given to officers in order to increase their responsiveness to
community concerns (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Scheider et al., 2009). Also, while
investigators have traditionally operated out of centralized bureaus and consequently had
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little interaction with patrol officers, community-oriented policing encourages the
decentralization of investigators (Meese & Kurz, 1993) to allow them to work alongside
and readily share information with patrol officers so as to more effectively reduce crime
and quality-of-life problems (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Meese & Kurz, 1993).
With its emphasis on community involvement, organizational restructuring, and
problem-solving, community-oriented policing represents a dramatic departure from the
previous, decades-old image of the American police as socially detached “crime-fighters.”
However, the implementation of community-oriented policing was not the first attempt to
improve policing through increased community involvement and organizational reform.
By the early 1970s, it had become apparent that traditional policing strategies were
unable to adequately control rising crime rates or improve deteriorating policecommunity relations (Kelling and Moore, 1988); in response, police departments in
several cities across the United States experimented with a revolutionary concept known
as team policing.
Team policing involves the continuous assignment of patrol officers and
investigators to the same, defined geographical area, which allows officers to become
familiar with area residents and problems and to use that knowledge to implement
effective problem-solving strategies (Szynkowski, 1981; Walker, 1993). Similar to
community-oriented policing, team policing requires decentralized decision-making,
which allow officers assigned to the area the authority to develop and implement crime
reduction strategies; facilitates better information sharing between officers and
investigators; and encourages community participation in crime control and prevention
(Walker, 1993).
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Team policing was heralded at its inception for its potential to improve policecommunity relations and more effectively control crime (Sherman, Milton, & Kelly,
1973). Indeed, several team policing projects did have a positive influence on policecommunity relations and crime control, as well as officer morale (e.g., Bloch & Bell,
1976; Schwartz & Clarren, 1977). However, despite the initial enthusiasm and apparent
successes, team policing quickly faded from use because it lacked support from the
centralized police bureaucracy (Walker, 1993).
With its emphasis on physical and command decentralization, team policing
failed to become a policing standard because its design was incompatible with the
centralized police bureaucracy of the era. Furthermore, team police operated much like a
special unit because traditional policing principles continued to guide the rest of the
police department (Walker, 1993). In contrast, community-oriented policing has had a
dramatic and lasting impact on policing because it is a philosophy that redefines the
police role and influences the operations of police departments as a whole. Because
community-oriented policing involves entire police departments and promotes many of
the same operational changes as team policing does, it creates a supportive atmosphere in
which the team policing approach has a better chance to succeed.
Over the last several years, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has
implemented various organizational changes in support of improved community-oriented
policing, the most recent of which resulted in the development of its own version of team
policing. In March 2012, the Community Crimes Team, which operates in the
Convention Center Area Command, began a focused intervention in the Palos Verdes
neighborhood in order to resolve the various community problems that have led to
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numerous incidents of violent crime, property crime, and disorder in the area in recent
years.
The Palos Verdes project was a collaborative effort involving the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department, other local agencies and businesses, and neighborhood
residents, which incorporated several policing strategies into the team policing approach
including community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing, and hot spots policing.
The intervention was designed to improve police-community relations, give the residents
a sense of pride in their community, empower them to maintain a good quality of life
within the neighborhood, and consequently reduce the amount of crime and disorder in
the area.
Though the planning and development stages of several previous team policing
projects are well-documented, few studies have assessed the effects of these projects in
the areas where they were implemented. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to
evaluate the impact of team policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood in Las Vegas,
Nevada.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Modern American policing has evolved much since it began during the mid-1800s.
The history of modern American policing can be divided into three eras: the political era,
the reform era, and the community-oriented era. Each of these eras can be distinguished
from one another in terms of the organization of the police, the nature of their
responsibilities, and their level of involvement with the community.
The earliest era of modern American policing was the political era, which lasted
from the 1840s to the 1920s. By this time in their history, police departments had
developed into quasi-military organizations with a centralized command; however, due to
the technological limitations of the time, police operations were considerably
decentralized (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Before the widespread use of automobiles,
officers patrolled their assigned beats on foot, which allowed them to become wellacquainted with residents in the area and knowledgeable about their problems and
concerns. Because officers did not yet have radios to keep them in constant contact with
the centralized command, they had much discretion in handling the problems they
encountered on their beats.
Though crime control was always a priority, the police had many additional
responsibilities during the political era. Officers addressed both social and physical
disorder concerns such as public intoxication and vandalism and provided various social
services to the community such as obtaining meals and housing for the homeless (Moore
& Kelling, 1983), and helping newly-arrived immigrants to find work (Kelling & Moore,
1988). In addition, residents and local political leaders had considerable influence over
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police activities and much police work revolved around addressing what they considered
to be major concerns. Policing during the political era did have its strengths in that
officers provided many useful services to residents beyond mere law enforcement and
also became very familiar with all aspects of the communities they patrolled (Kelling &
Moore, 1988). However, due to the decentralization and limited supervision in early
police departments, officers were also highly inefficient with regard to crime control and
easily corrupted by neighborhood influences (Kelling & Moore, 1988).
The next era of modern policing, the reform era, began during the early 1930s in
response to the corruption and inefficiency that plagued the police during the political era
and also defined the image of police officers until the 1970s. Considering neighborhood
influences along with a weak command structure to be the major sources of police
corruption and inefficiency, police reformers including August Vollmer and O. W.
Wilson led efforts to change policing in various ways (Kelling & Bratton, 1993).
One of the hallmarks of reform era policing was the strengthening of centralized
command and control. Political leaders no longer had control over the police; instead,
middle managers, such as captains and lieutenants, were responsible for directing police
activities. Middle managers also held much of the decision-making authority in the
organization while officer discretion became greatly restricted (Kelling, 1994; Kelling &
Bratton, 1993; Kelling & Moore, 1988). Also, while officers formerly conducted a wide
range of activities within their assigned neighborhoods, reforms separated investigations
from patrol activities so specialization, rather than geography, determined officer
assignments (Kelling, 1994; Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Kelling & Moore, 1988).
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Along with the organizational restructuring, the nature of police work also
transformed. Police officers now focused primarily on law enforcement and making
arrests while their social service duties became the responsibility of social workers
(Moore & Kelling, 1983). Officers utilized new crime control tactics, such as preventive
patrol and rapid response to calls for service in their new role as “crime-fighters.” Patrol
cars replaced foot patrol because they enabled officers to respond to calls for service
more quickly and over a greater geographical area. However, despite this increased
efficiency, the use of patrol cars also contributed to the alienation of officers from the
communities they patrolled (Kelling & Moore, 1988).
Police reforms also redefined the role of the community in policing. Instead of
approaching a patrol officer, residents now called a central dispatcher to notify the police
about neighborhood problems. Crime control was considered the sole responsibility of
the police and residents were expected to not interfere (Kelling & Moore, 1988).
Centralizing officers and redefining their interactions with residents did aid in alleviating
corruption, but had the unintended consequence of straining police-community relations.
The current era of modern policing, the community-oriented era, emerged during
the late 1970s as a way to “reconnect police to citizens and encourage innovative,
proactive, collaborative, and strategic approaches to crime prevention” (Scheider et al.,
2009, p. 695). Not only had the use of motorized patrol and organizational reform
contributed to strained police-community relations, policing research concluded that
conventional policing strategies, such as preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for
service, and follow-up investigations did not significantly reduce crime (Braga, Flynn,
Kelling, & Cole, 2010). As with previous reforms, community-oriented policing
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instituted various organizational changes and again redefined both the nature of police
responsibilities and the role of the community in policing.
The effectiveness of community-oriented policing depends, in part, on the police
being informed about problems in the community and using that knowledge to develop
policies that will resolve those problems; however, the traditional centralized command
structure hinders that effectiveness. Because decision-making in a centralized command
is the responsibility of police administrators who are in the higher levels of the chain of
command and who have little interaction with the communities their policies affect, the
police are disadvantaged in their ability to identify and resolve community problems
(Angell, 1971; Walker, 1993). In contrast, community-oriented policing supports
decentralized decision-making to allow officers who work in the community to have
more responsibility in planning and implementing responses to community problems
(Scheider et al., 2009).
Community-oriented policing also supports the physical decentralization of
investigators as a way to utilize their knowledge and skills more effectively in crime
control and prevention. During the reform era, when investigations became highly
specialized and separate from patrol activities, investigators operated out of centralized
bureaus where case records were located. However, given that advances in informationsharing technology now allow instant access to records across jurisdictions, investigator
centralization is no longer necessary (Meese & Kurz, 1993). In addition, though
investigators acquire considerable knowledge through their work about crime patterns
and their underlying causes, centralized investigations have traditionally focused on
making arrests rather than preventing crime. In contrast, physical decentralization

8

enables investigators to readily share that knowledge with patrol officers and collaborate
with them in order to develop better crime control and prevention strategies (Braga et al.,
2010).
While crime control was the major emphasis of policing during the reform era,
community-oriented policing focuses on addressing the underlying problems that cause
crime, disorder, and fear of crime in communities. Community-oriented policing
encourages the formation of partnerships between the police and community in order to
identify problems and develop problem-solving strategies to control and prevent crime
(Scheider et al., 2009). Rather than relying solely on official police responses like arrest
to reduce crime, community-oriented policing encourages the use of a variety of
alternative interventions when developing these problem-solving strategies (Scheider et
al., 2009).
Problem-Oriented Policing
As a consequence of the widespread corruption and inefficiency in policing
during the political era, the dominant reform philosophy through the 1960s was that
policing could be most dramatically improved through organizational reform (Goldstein,
1979; Kelling & Bratton, 1993). However, Goldstein (1979) argued that continuing to
focus solely on police management reform ignores the true purpose of policing, which is
to resolve the variety of problems that cause crime, disorder, and fear of crime within
communities.
In developing the problem-oriented policing approach, Goldstein emphasized that
police should be more methodical in how they address problems. Eck and Spelman
(1987) developed the SARA model, which complements Goldstein’s original
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recommendation and provides the framework that has been used to develop numerous
problem-oriented policing interventions. Following the SARA model, officers scan for
problems in an area, analyze the nature of those problems, develop a response, and
analyze whether the chosen response has had the desired impact (Eck & Spelman, 1987).
Problem-oriented policing interventions address the underlying problems that
cause crime and disorder in communities by removing the opportunities and incentives
for those incidents to occur. While many problem-oriented policing evaluations have
reported significant decreases in crime and disorder in intervention areas, one major
criticism of these studies is that they often neglect to consider the possibility that these
problems have been relocated rather than reduced (Eck, 1993). However, because the
opportunities for crime and disorder to occur are not evenly distributed and vary in terms
of the risks and rewards they present to potential offenders, complete crime displacement
rarely occurs. Moreover, when displacement does occur, it is usually not extensive
enough to completely negate the beneficial effects of a successful crime control
intervention (Eck, 1993; Weisburd et al., 2006).
An alternative to crime displacement involves the diffusion of crime control
benefits. In other words, this diffusion occurs when catchment areas near the
intervention area experience decreases in crime and disorder without being directly
exposed to the intervention strategies (Eck, 1993; Weisburd et al., 2006). Assuming that
the same offenders are responsible for crime and disorder in the intervention and
catchment areas, one explanation for the diffusion of crime control benefits suggests that
the apprehension and subsequent incapacitation of these offenders causes crime and
disorder decreases in both areas (Braga, et al, 1999). However, considering that the
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majority of offenders are only incapacitated for short periods, a more likely explanation is
that potential offenders are deterred in catchment areas because they incorrectly assume
that the geographical boundaries of the police interventions extend much farther than the
intervention area (Braga et al, 1999; Weisburd et al, 2006).
Hot Spots Policing
Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) conducted a study to determine the
distribution of calls for police service in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Their study
determined that calls for service were not evenly distributed across the city, but instead
clustered at certain locations, also referred to as “hot spots.” In Minneapolis, 50.4
percent of all calls for service recorded over a one-year period originated at just 3.3
percent of all the addresses in the city. However, Sherman et al. also found that the
majority of the calls for service at these locations were for minor incidents (e.g., traffic
accidents and noise complaints). Importantly, this indicates that though police may be
dispatched repeatedly to certain addresses, these hot spots are not necessarily more
dangerous than other locations where calls for service originate less frequently.
The identification of hot spots is particularly important for the police when using
problem-oriented policing strategies because it allows them to focus their resources on
the locations where disproportionately high amounts of crime and disorder occur (Taylor,
Koper, & Woods, 2011; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Several studies have examined the
effectiveness of problem-oriented policing at reducing crime in hot spots. Comparing the
effectiveness of saturation patrol to that of problem-oriented policing in violent hot spots
in Jacksonville, Florida, Taylor et al. (2011) found that the use of problem-oriented
strategies resulted in a 33 percent decrease in violent street crime incidents in the 90-day
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period following the police intervention. In a study of violent crime hot spots in Jersey
City, New Jersey, Braga et al. (1999) found that street fight, property crime, and narcotics
calls for service, as well as robbery and property crime incidents, all decreased
significantly in areas that received problem-oriented interventions. Braga and Bond
(2008) studied problem-oriented policing interventions at 17 hot spots in Lowell,
Massachusetts that combined various policing strategies such as situational crime
prevention, social service referrals, and order maintenance. Braga and Bond found that
the use of problem-oriented interventions was associated with a 40 percent decrease in
robbery calls for service, a 34 percent decrease in assault calls for service, and a 36
percent decrease in burglary calls for service; they also found that situational crime
prevention measures had the most influence on crime reduction.
Team Policing
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice recommended team policing as an alternative to the traditional model of policing,
which involves investigators and patrol officers working in separate locations, having
little contact with one another, and following different chains of command. Instead, the
President’s Commission suggested that officers be generalists capable of delivering both
investigative and patrol services within the same defined area and follow a single chain of
command (Winslow, 1969). According to the President’s Commission, team policing
would lead to “increased crime solution and the most advantageous use of the time and
talents of all policemen” (Winslow, 1969, p. 268). Recognizing that tensions had been
increasing between police and communities since the civil rights conflicts of the 1960s,
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police administrators also considered team policing a viable way to improve policecommunity relations (Walker, 1993).
The underlying principle of team policing is that close community interaction is
an essential element of successful crime control (Vastola, 1977). Continuous assignment
to a defined geographical area keeps officers in regular contact with community residents
and aids officers in both identifying problems in the area and collecting information that
can lead to improved crime control (Syznkowski, 1981). Additionally, the decentralized
decision-making that is an integral part of team policing allows officers assigned to the
area the authority to develop and implement individualized solutions to neighborhood
problems and thereby makes officers more responsive to community concerns (Walker,
1993).
By the mid-1970s, approximately 60 police departments around the United States
had experimented with their own versions of team policing (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977).
Much of the existing team policing evaluation literature is limited to descriptions of the
planning and development phases of these projects and provides little discussion, if any,
regarding the impact of team policing on crime and other problems (e.g., Kerstetter,
1981; Myren, 1972; Sherman, et al., 1973). The few cities whose team policing projects’
impact has been discussed in greater detail include Cincinnati (Ohio), Detroit (Michigan),
and Rochester (New York).
Cincinnati, Ohio
The Cincinnati Police Division’s (CPD) Community Sector Team Policing
(COMSEC) project lasted from March 1973 until September 1975 and was designed to
reduce crime and improve police-community relations. This project represented CPD’s
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second attempt at team policing after a 1971 attempt failed due to implementation
problems. COMSEC was implemented in a 3.7 square mile area known as District 1.
This area had a residential population of 35,000 though with the influx of workers,
shoppers, and tourists during the week, the daily population was often closer to 250,000.
District 1 was divided into six sectors; a team was assigned to each sector and one
lieutenant and three sergeants supervised each team. COMSEC officers were given the
authority to plan and coordinate all police activities in their assigned areas and were
encouraged to act as generalists, meaning that they would be responsible for both patrol
and investigative duties (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977).
Though COMSEC initially operated as it was designed, administrative decisions
greatly affected the program after the first 18 months. The teams became less
autonomous and decentralized; the centralized command increased its control over police
activities in District 1 and specialized investigators, rather than team officers, were
assigned to handle most of the investigations in the area. While officers were initially
enthusiastic about COMSEC, the police administrators’ lack of commitment to the
original model affected the officers’ morale (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977).
Despite the administrative changes that led to the eventual demise of COMSEC,
an evaluation of the project did find that the program had been successful in many ways.
Survey results indicated that team policing had a positive impact on police-community
relations and officer attitudes. Regarding crime in the city, team policing had the greatest
impact on burglary; according to UCR data, District 1 had greater decreases in burglaries
than the rest of the city during the first 18 months of COMSEC. Further, local businesses
also reported in victimization surveys that they experienced fewer burglaries and
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robberies during the same 18 months. However, after the operational changes in
COMSEC took effect, burglaries in the city increased to just below their pre-COMSEC
levels and victimization survey reports of commercial burglaries and robberies matched
their pre-COMSEC levels (Schwartz & Clarren, 1977).
Detroit, Michigan
In April 1970, the Detroit Police Department implemented the Beat Commander
project in a small, predominately black neighborhood located in the Tenth Precinct, an
area that had been experiencing a dramatic increase in crime over the previous four years
and accounted for 18 percent of the serious crime in the precinct. Through decentralized
decision-making and the focused delivery of police services in a small area, the Beat
Commander project was designed to improve police-community relations and reduce
crime (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972).
The Beat Commander team began with two supervising sergeants – one who
acted as the beat commander and another who acted as the assistant beat commander;
eighteen black patrolmen and six white patrolmen; and three investigators, though
staffing levels did fluctuate over the course of the project. As beat commanders who
were accountable for all police operations in the project area, the sergeants had many
more responsibilities than regular sergeants; for example, they were required to use data
analysis to manage patrol activities, handle community complaints, supervise officers at
work in the project area, and report to the precinct commander about the Beat
Commander project (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972).
Patrol activities were also different in the project area. In addition to their regular
duties, patrolmen were instructed to make regular contacts with residents. Though patrol
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cars were still used during each of the three daily shifts, several officers were assigned to
patrol the neighborhood on foot or by scooter during times of increased criminal activity.
While the team officers were supposed to remain in the project area during their shifts,
central dispatchers often ignored this requirement and assigned Beat Command patrol
cars to calls elsewhere in the precinct. The investigators particularly enjoyed being
assigned exclusively to the Beat Commander project area because it enabled them “to
develop information sources more successfully and to recognize crime patterns more
clearly” (Bloch & Ulberg, 1972, p. 59).
The Beat Commander project ended in 1971 and though it appeared to have a
positive influence on police-community relations and officer morale, proper evaluation
conditions were never established so the impact of the program on crime is unclear. The
number of reported crimes in the area increased from 16 to 23 percent of the total reports
in the precinct during the intervention period, but it was never determined whether the
increase in reports was due to an actual increase in crime or the result of residents’
increased willingness to bring crime problems to the attention of the officers (Bloch &
Ulberg, 1972).
Rochester, New York
In response to increasing crime rates, the Rochester Police Department began a
team policing project known as Coordinated Team Patrol (CTP) in 1971 as a way to
improve its crime clearance rates and the quality of its investigations. The department
created two teams that were permanently assigned to deliver all police services within
separate, defined areas of the city. Each team was comprised of about 30 patrol officers
and six investigators who were supervised by two lieutenants. The areas that were
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eventually selected for the team policing interventions – patrol areas A and C – were
similar to one another in multiple respects; each area covered approximately one-third of
the city and had a significant proportion of minority, juvenile, and impoverished residents
as compared to the rest of the city (Bloch & Bell, 1976).
An evaluation of the impact of CTP occurred between July and November 1973.
In terms of arrests, the evaluation found that the team police were more likely to make an
arrest during a burglary, larceny, or robbery investigation than the non-team officers in
patrol area B. Similarly, team police cleared more burglary, larceny, and robbery cases
than non-team officers did. Both team and non-team officers had a positive opinion of
the project, noting that team policing facilitated better communication between patrol
officers and investigators, and allowed them address crime problems more effectively
(Bloch & Bell, 1976).
While the evaluation did not find that the overall crime rate decreased more in
Rochester after the implementation of CTP as compared to other similarly sized cities, it
did find a difference in crime rates between the team and non-team areas. Before the
CTP project began, both burglary and robbery rates were higher in the team areas than
the non-team area, though the non-team area did have a higher larceny rate. Afterward,
burglary, robbery, and larceny rates all increased (and remained higher) in the non-team
area while those rates all decreased in the team areas (Bloch & Bell, 1976).
The Decline of Team Policing
Despite the successes of team policing projects and the enthusiasm of the officers
involved in them, team policing encountered much opposition from within the police
departments and quickly disappeared from use. For example, police middle managers,
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who often did not want to relinquish their control over police activities, opposed
command decentralization and prevented the proper implementation of team policing
projects (Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Sherman, 1975). Other officers in the department,
who were often not well-informed about the nature of team policing or what it sought to
accomplish, were also unsupportive of the projects and resented the team officers’
successes (Walker, 1993). Centralized dispatching technology was also problematic
because team officers were frequently dispatched to calls outside of their assigned areas,
which limited the time officers could spend resolving neighborhood problems (Walker,
1993).
Team Policing in the Community-Oriented Era
Team policing failed to become an enduring police strategy when it was first
implemented because it was incompatible with the rigid, centralized model of policing
prevalent at the time. However, through its support of physical and command
decentralization, increased community involvement in crime control and prevention, and
problem-focused policing strategies, community-oriented policing has changed police
departments in many ways that complement the use of team policing.
With the development of new policing strategies in recent decades, police have
become more innovative in their use of interventions to address community problems.
This study evaluates the impact of a team policing intervention that incorporated the
community-oriented, problem-oriented, and hot spots policing strategies in an effort to
address crime and disorder problems in the Palos Verdes neighborhood in Las Vegas,
Nevada.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The Palos Verdes Project
Formerly located in the Lincoln 1 sector/beat of the Convention Center Area
Command1, the Palos Verdes neighborhood is a predominately Spanish-speaking
Hispanic/Latino, lower-income area where the majority of residents live in rented
housing. In recent years, as property owners and managers had neglected basic building
maintenance, drug houses had been established, and gang activity had increased, the
quality of life in the neighborhood had diminished and the area had become a hot spot for
violent crime, property crime, and disorder. The neighborhood has also had a history of
severely strained police-community relations, which stems from a 1996 incident in which
two off-duty officers shot and killed a neighborhood resident without justification
(Benjamin, 1997). According to Convention Center Area Command officers, mistrust of
the police caused many incidents in the neighborhood to go unreported in the years since
the shooting and residents often refused to cooperate with investigations. This mistrust
also limited the officers’ ability to improve neighborhood conditions and address the
underlying problems in the area that have led to crime and disorder.
In an effort to finally resolve the ongoing problems in the neighborhood, the
Convention Center Area Command initiated the Palos Verdes team policing project on
March 27, 2012. The goals of the project were to not only reduce crime and disorder
incidents and restore the residents’ confidence in the police, but to instill in the residents
a sense of pride in their community, to encourage them to be responsible for

1

Due to the reorganization of the Convention Center Area Command in February 2013, the Palos Verdes
neighborhood is now located in the Nora 2 sector/beat of the South Central Area Command.
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neighborhood crime control and prevention, and to create an environment where residents
have only minimal need for police intervention.
Community Crimes Team
The Community Crimes Team wass the unit responsible for developing and
implementing the various activities associated with the team policing intervention in the
Palos
los Verdes neighborhood. Between April and December 2012,, the team was
comprised of seven officers, one crime prevention specialist, and one investigator and
wass supervised by one sergeant and one lieutenant
lieutenant. One officer acted as the lead officer
while another
her officer, who spoke Spanish, wass primarily responsible for community
outreach efforts and facilitating communication between the team and non-Englishnon
speaking residents.. The other officers had administrative, law enforcement, intelligence,
intell
and logistics specialties, though the officers share
shared responsibility
lity for coordinating all the
team activities in the neighbor
neighborhood. Figure 1 shows the organization of the Community
Crimes Team.

Figure 1. Community
mmunity Crimes Team
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During the initial months of the intervention, the team met weekly to discuss the
status of the various problems in the Palos Verdes neighborhood and to plan police and
community activities designed to address those problems. The team also participated in
regular community meetings, which encouraged communication between the residents
and officers about problems in the neighborhood and the progress of the intervention.
Intervention
Proactive policing strategies such as saturation patrol and investigations were
used primarily when the team policing intervention first began as a way to remove the
most problematic individuals (i.e., known gang members and drug offenders) from the
area. The majority of this work was completed during the team’s first few weeks in the
neighborhood so the remainder of the intervention became largely a community effort
with minimal need for law enforcement activities. Several intervention activities were
aimed at improving the quality of life in the neighborhood. Between April and August
2012, the Community Crimes Team organized four Combined Multi-Agency Response
Team (CMART) inspections. These inspections involved several agencies including the
Clark County Health District, Clark County Code Enforcement, the Fire Prevention
Division, NV Energy, Public Works, and social service agencies and were conducted in
order to get property owners and managers to make necessary improvements to their
buildings and to improve the quality of the residents’ living conditions. In addition, the
team also organized trash and graffiti cleanup events in April and July 2012 in which
they encouraged all the residents to participate and become more involved in caring for
their neighborhood.
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Other intervention activities focused on community outreach. In addition to
regularly patrolling the neighborhood and making contacts with residents, the
Community Crimes Team organized several community events. In May 2012,
approximately 200 people attended the Palos Verdes Pride event, which was organized in
partnership with other agencies and local businesses that donated various items and
services, and was held in order to bring the residents together and promote community
cohesion. Other major community events included National Night Out in August 2012,
which focused on promoting neighborhood crime prevention, and “Trunk or Treat” in
October 2012, at which officers handed out candy and provided the neighborhood
children with various other Halloween-themed activities. In addition to organizing these
events, the Community Crimes Team also partnered with social service and faith-based
organizations to provide services aimed at improving the well-being of the residents.

Figure 2. Timeline of Major Intervention Activities in the Palos Verdes Neighborhood
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Figure 2 shows an approximate timeline of the major activities that occurred between
April and December 2012. Through these various activities and community partnerships,
the team policing intervention was designed to help the residents build the strong sense of
community that had long been nonexistent in the area and in so doing, enable them to
more effectively regulate their neighborhood in an effort to reduce crime and disorder.
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Hypotheses
The results from the evaluations of the team policing projects in Cincinnati (Ohio),
Detroit (Michigan), and Rochester (New York) suggest not only that team policing may
have a greater impact on crime than traditional policing does, but also that team policing
may have a greater impact on certain types of crime. Therefore, this study will evaluate
the following eight hypotheses:
H1: Team policing will have an impact on violent calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period.
H2: Team policing will have an impact on property calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period.
H3: Team policing will have an impact on disorder calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period.
H4: Team policing will have an impact on total calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the immediate pre-intervention period.
H5: Team policing will have an impact on violent calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011.
H6: Team policing will have an impact on property calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011.
H7: Team policing will have an impact on disorder calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011.
H8: Team policing will have an impact on total calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as compared to the same period in 2011.
Data
This study uses calls for service data to evaluate the impact of team policing in
the Palos Verdes neighborhood. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
provided calls for service data from April 2011 through December 2012 and classified
them into three offense categories – violent, property, and disorder calls for service,
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which each include specific offenses. Appendix A provides a listing of the various
offenses considered in the analyses by category along with their corresponding Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department dispatch codes. In all, calls for 21 violent offenses, five
property offenses, and 21 disorder offenses were considered in the analyses.
Previous studies have used calls for service as a measure of crime and disorder
(e.g., Klinger & Bridges, 1997; Sherman, et al., 1989; Warner & Pierce, 1993) though
these studies do note that calls for service data do have some limitations that can affect
their accuracy as such a measure. First, residents may report incidents inaccurately to the
police dispatcher. For example, when a resident reports a robbery, the responding officer
may either determine that a crime did not occur or reclassify the robbery as a different
offense (e.g., a burglary). Second, one incident may be reported multiple times and thus
be counted as separate incidents. Third, calls for service data do not include those
incidents that residents do not report to the police or, alternately, those incidents that
residents report to a patrol officer rather than to a police dispatcher.
Considering that one of the goals of the team policing intervention is to restore the
residents’ confidence in the police so that they will notify the police when crime and
disorder incidents occur, calls for service data are still appropriate for use in this study.
However, due to their limitations and because calls for service primarily indicate how
often residents contact the police for assistance (Warner & Pierce, 1993), it is with
caution that these data are used to describe changes in the amount of crime and disorder
in the Palos Verdes neighborhood after the implementation of the team policing
intervention.
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Research Design
Because random assignment was not feasible, this study utilizes a quasiexperimental, non-equivalent control groups design. To determine the impact of team
policing, the analyses involve comparing the number of calls for service before and after
the implementation of team policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood as well as
comparing the number of calls for service in three control areas during the same periods.
The analyses also compare the calls for service data in a catchment area adjacent to the
Palos Verdes neighborhood to assess whether the team policing intervention has
displaced crime or, alternately, whether a diffusion of crime control benefits from the
team policing intervention has occurred nearby.

Figure 3. Palos Verdes Neighborhood and Catchment Area

© Google

Palos Verdes

Catchment Area

The Palos Verdes neighborhood and the catchment area, which were formerly
located in the Lincoln 1 sector/beat of the Convention Center Area Command, are shown
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in Figure 3. Similar to the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the catchment area is a small,
rented housing area that, according to Convention Center Area Command officers, has
also been the location of numerous crime and disorder incidents in recent years. Due to
these characteristics and its proximity to the Palos Verdes neighborhood, it may provide
similar opportunities for crime and disorder to occur that could potentially be exploited
by offenders displaced by the team policing intervention.
The three control areas were chosen in consultation with the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department and are similar to the Palos Verdes neighborhood in
terms of their size, demographics, and numbers of calls for service in 2011. Appendices
B, C, and D provide further geographical information about the five comparison areas;
specifically, Appendix B shows the geographical boundaries of each control area,
Appendix C includes a map of the city of Las Vegas, Nevada which shows the locations
of all five comparison areas relative to one another, and Appendix D includes a map of
the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Area Command jurisdictions which
shows the location of the sector/beat associated with each comparison area.

Table 1
Calls for Service in the Comparison Areas, April 1, 2011-December 31, 2011
Area

Violent

Property

Disorder

Total

Palos Verdes

6

8

87

101

Catchment Area

11

6

108

125

Control Area 1

37

12

101

150

Control Area 2

4

15

69

88

Control Area 3

18

14

187

219
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Prior to the team policing intervention, these five areas had comparable numbers
of calls for service. Table 1 shows the numbers of calls for service by offense category in
each comparison area between April 1, 2011 and December 31, 2011. Similar to the
Palos Verdes neighborhood, the control areas are lower-income areas with high
percentages of Hispanic/Latino residents and rented housing as compared to the city of
Las Vegas. Table 2 provides specific demographic data for the Palos Verdes
neighborhood and catchment area, the three control areas, and the city of Las Vegas.
This study focuses on the first nine complete months of the intervention (April
2012 to December 2012). To assess the immediate impact of team policing in the
neighborhood, calls for service during this nine-month intervention period were
compared to calls for service during the nine-month period immediately before the
intervention (July 2011 to March 2012). To control for seasonal effect, calls for service
during the intervention period were also compared to calls for service during the same
nine-month period in the previous year (April 2011 to December 2011).
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Table 2
Demographics of the Comparison Areas
Palos Verdes /
Variable
Control 1
Catchment

Control 2

Control 3

Las Vegas

Sex (%)
Male

58.7

50.8

54.3

51.8

50.3

Female

41.3

49.2

45.7

48.2

49.7

0-19

23.6

31.3

24.5

48.1

28.0

20-34

29.9

22.3

26.0

25.1

22.0

35-44

13.7

14.4

11.4

7.7

14.9

45-54

14.6

9.8

15.2

14.5

13.6

55 and over

18.4

22.2

22.9

4.5

21.5

Age in years (%)a

Race, non-Hispanic/Latino (%)
White

35.3

40.0

30.9

12.8

47.5

Black

3.2

10.4

14.3

22.1

10.4

Other

5.5

5.7

6.4

1.2

12.1

56.0

43.9

48.4

63.9

30.0

35,466

52,153

39,936

26,865

70,135

Poverty (%)

15.8

19.6

27.5

41.8

13.5

Rented housing (%)

94.1

57.5

69.2

100.0

44.6

Residency ≤ 5 years (%)

73.4

57.8

65.3

89.4

55.0

Hispanic/Latino (%)
Mean income ($)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d)
Percentages may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

a.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSES AND RESULTS
The first part of the analyses involved a visual examination of the calls for service
trends in each area and the second part involved the use of t-tests to determine whether
the differences in mean calls for service per week in the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the
three control areas, and the catchment area were statistically significant. An independent
samples t-test was used to compare the mean calls for service per week during the ninemonth intervention period (April 2012 to December 2012) with the nine-month period
immediately prior to the intervention (July 2011 to March 2012). A paired samples t-test
was used to compare the mean calls for service per week during the intervention period
with the same nine-month period in the previous year (April 2011 to December 2012).
The paired samples t-test was selected over the independent samples t-test in that case
because the analysis involves comparing the mean calls for service per week in the same
period, but under two different conditions.
To calculate the mean calls for service per week during the three time periods, the
data were first divided into weeks and the numbers of violent, property, disorder, and
total calls for service were recorded for each week. Then, the numbers of calls for
service were divided by the total number of weeks in each period. Because the data were
divided so that each week began on Sunday and ended on Saturday, one week in each
time period contained less than seven days; therefore, the data from those weeks were
excluded from the statistical analyses. As a result, each period in the statistical analyses
contained 39 weeks of data.
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Figures 8-17 in Appendix E show the trends in total calls for service across the
five comparison areas. Specifically, Figures 8-12 show the calls for service trends across
the pre-intervention and intervention periods and Figures 13-17 show quarterly
comparisons of the calls for service trends during the intervention period with the same
months in 2011. Comparing the intervention period to the prior nine-month period,
Figure 8 indicates that the pattern of calls for service changed in the Palos Verdes
neighborhood, with notable spikes occurring during the first ten weeks of the intervention.
Figure 9 indicates that the pattern of calls for service in the catchment area generally
remained consistent. Figures 10 and 11 similarly indicate relatively little change in the
pattern of calls for service in Control Areas 1 and 2, respectively. In contrast, Figure 12
shows a noticeable decrease in weekly calls for service in Control Area 3, particularly
after the tenth week of the intervention period. Comparing the intervention period to the
same period in 2011, Figure 13 shows a similar pattern of calls for service in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood during the first 10 weeks, which may indicate that the notable calls
for service spikes were the result of a seasonal influence on calls for service rather than
the police intervention. Figures 14, 15, and 16 all show relatively few pattern differences
in the catchment area and Control Areas 1 and 2, respectively. However, Figure 17 again
shows considerable decreases in weekly calls for service in Control Area 3, particularly
during the second, third, and fourth quarters.
The results of the t-tests lend support to visual trends observed in the comparison
areas. The results of the independent samples t-tests comparing the nine-month period
immediately prior to the intervention with the nine-month intervention period are shown
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in Table 3 and the results of the paired samples t-tests comparing the nine-month
intervention period with the same nine-month period in 2011 are shown in Table 4.

Table 3
Changes in Calls for Service, Pre-Intervention: Intervention
July 2011-March 2012 April-December 2012 N Change
Area
(%)
N
M (SD)
N
M (SD)
Palos Verdes
Violent
8 .21 (.41)
18 .46 (.68) 125.00
Property
9 .23 (.43)
18 .46 (.82) 100.00
94 2.41 (1.65)
14.63
Disorder
82 2.10 (1.41)
Total
99 2.54 (1.52)
130 3.33 (1.92)
31.31

2.013*
1.556
.885
2.025*

Catchment Area
Violent
Property
Disorder
Total

10 .26
5 .13
103 2.64
118 3.03

(.50)
(.34)
(1.91)
(1.98)

15 .38
14 .36
92 2.36
121 3.10

(.67)
(.78)
(1.76)
(2.26)

50.00
180.00
-10.68
2.54

.956
1.699
-.679
.160

Control Area 1
Violent
Property
Disorder
Total

31 .79
12 .31
80 2.05
123 3.15

(1.06)
(.52)
(1.76)
(2.28)

25 .64
5 .13
114 2.92
144 3.69

(.90)
(.34)
(1.93)
(2.38)

-19.35
-58.33
42.50
17.07

-.692
-1.804
2.087*
1.022

Control Area 2
Violent
Property
Disorder
Total

7 .18
10 .26
62 1.59
88 2.03

(.39)
(.55)
(1.23)
(1.29)

10 .26
25 .64
63 1.62
97 2.49

(.55)
(.96)
(1.41)
(1.81)

42.86
150.00
1.61
22.78

.714
2.173*
.086
1.300

Control Area 3
Violent
13 .33
Property
16 .41
Disorder
155 3.97
Total
184 4.72
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01

(.66)
(.50)
(2.25)
(2.74)

11 .28
4 .10
75 1.92
90 2.31

(.65)
(.38)
(1.46)
(1.59)

-15.38
-75.00
-51.61
-51.09

-.346
-3.056**
-4.773**
-4.746**
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Table 4
Changes in Calls for Service, Previous Year: Intervention
April-December 2011 April-December 2012
Area
N
M (SD)
N
M (SD)
Palos Verdes
Violent
6 .15 (.37)
18 .46 (.68)
Property
8 .21 (.47)
18 .46 (.82)
Disorder
86 2.21 (1.79)
94 2.41 (1.65)
Total
100 2.56 (1.98)
130 3.33 (1.92)

N Change
(%)

t

200.00
125.00
9.30
30.00

2.508*
1.885
.572
2.059*

Catchment Area
Violent
Property
Disorder
Total

11 .28 (.51)
6 .15 (.37)
107 2.74 (2.12)
124 3.18 (2.13)

15 .38 (.67)
14 .36 (.78)
92 2.36 (1.76)
121 3.10 (2.26)

36.36
133.33
-14.02
-2.42

1.000
1.388
-1.029
-.175

Control Area 1
Violent
Property
Disorder
Total

37 .95 (1.05)
12 .31 (.52)
101 2.59 (1.74)
150 3.85 (2.20)

25 .64 (.90)
5 .13 (.34)
114 2.92 (1.93)
144 3.69 (2.38)

-32.43
-58.33
12.87
-4.00

-1.356
-1.741
.750
-.289

Control Area 2
Violent
Property
Disorder
Total

4 .10 (.31)
15 .38 (.63)
68 1.74 (1.39)
88 2.26 (1.55)

10 .26 (.55)
25 .64 (.96)
63 1.62 (1.41)
97 2.49 (1.81)

150.00
66.67
-7.35
10.23

1.433
1.433
-.397
.600

Control Area 3
Violent
18 .46 (.76)
Property
14 .36 (.49)
Disorder
186 4.77 (2.21)
Total
218 5.59 (2.51)
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01

11 .28 (.65)
4 .10 (.38)
75 1.92 (1.46)
90 2.31 (1.59)

-38.89
-71.43
-59.68
-58.72

-1.045
-2.693**
-6.273**
-6.482**

As shown in Table 3, the mean calls for service per week increased in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood during the intervention period in all calls for service categories as
compared to the prior nine-month period, though only the mean violent and mean total
calls for service increased significantly. However, the catchment area adjacent to the
Palos Verdes neighborhood did not experience a significant change in any of the calls for
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service categories. Control Area 1 only experienced a significant increase in mean
disorder calls for service per week while Control Area 2 only experienced a significant
increase in mean property calls for service per week. Finally, Control Area 3 experienced
a decrease in all calls for service categories with significant decreases in mean property,
mean disorder, and mean total calls for service per week.
As shown in Table 4, the mean calls for service in the Palos Verdes neighborhood
increased in all categories during the intervention period as compared to the same period
in 2011 and again, both the mean violent and mean total calls for service increased
significantly. As with the pre-intervention comparison, the catchment area adjacent to
the Palos Verdes neighborhood did not experience significant changes in any of the calls
for service categories. Neither Control Area 1 nor Control Area 2 had any significant
changes in the mean calls for service per week as compared to the same period in 2011.
Similar to the pre-intervention comparison, Control Area 3 experienced decreases in all
calls for service categories with significant decreases in mean property, mean disorder,
and mean total calls for service per week.
Despite significant increases in mean disorder and mean property calls per week
during the intervention period in Control Areas 1 and 2, respectively, there were no
significant differences in either of these areas in any of the calls for service categories as
compared to the same period in 2011. Therefore, a seasonal effect could be responsible
for the significant differences in mean calls for service between the pre-intervention and
intervention periods in those areas. In other words, it is possible that the numbers of
disorder and property calls for service are typically lower in Control Areas 1 and 2,
respectively, from July to March as compared with April to December.
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Though Figure 13 suggests that a seasonal effect may be responsible for some of
the observed calls for service spikes in the Palos Verdes neighborhood, considering that
both the mean violent and mean total calls for service increased significantly during the
intervention period as compared to both the pre-intervention period and the same period
in 2011, it is less likely that a seasonal effect is responsible for these increases. Therefore,
it is plausible that the team policing intervention was responsible for the observed
differences in calls for service per week in the Palos Verdes neighborhood. In support of
this, Figure 4 shows the number of calls for service per week along with the timeline of
major events during the intervention period in the Palos Verdes neighborhood.

Calls for Service

Figure 4. Total Calls for Service and Activities Timeline in the Palos Verdes
Neighborhood
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Though it cannot be determined for certain with the current data whether the
intervention activities influenced the calls for service trend, Figure 4 does show that
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several calls for service spikes occurred during or around the weeks of major team
activities. For example, notable spikes occurred just after the start of the team policing
intervention as well as during and just after the weeks of the Palos Verdes Community
Pride event and the second CMART (week 7).
The results of the t-tests indicate that the team policing intervention was
associated with significant increases in mean violent and mean total calls for service in
the Palos Verdes neighborhood during the intervention period as compared to both the
pre-intervention period and the same period in 2011. Therefore, the results lend support
to hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 8. Because the team policing intervention was not associated
with significant changes in mean disorder and property calls for service, the results do not
support hypotheses 2, 3, 6, and 7.

Table 5
Changes in Violent Calls for Service in the Palos Verdes Neighborhood

Code

Offense

Previous Year
April 1, 2011December 31,
2011

Pre-Intervention
July 1, 2011March 31,
2012

Intervention
April 1, 2012December 31,
2012

407G Robbery
(gang-related)
413
Person with a gun

0

0

1

0

0

1

413A Person with a knife

1

2

1

415

4

5

5

0

0

3

0

0

7

1

1

0

Assault/battery

415B Assault/battery with
other deadly weapon
415D Assault/battery
(domestic violence)
434
Illegal shooting
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The t-test results also suggest that the team policing intervention had a greater
impact on violent calls for service than on property and disorder calls for service. As
shown in Table 5, calls for service for assault and battery offenses (i.e., 415, 415B, and
415D) increased the most during the intervention period as compared to both the preintervention period and the same period in 2011. However, given the overall low
numbers of violent calls for service, it cannot be determined for certain whether the team
policing intervention had an influence on the reporting of these assault and battery
incidents.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As the results of the analyses suggest, calls for service increased in the Palos
Verdes neighborhood as a result of the team policing intervention. However, these
results do not necessarily indicate that crime and disorder incidents have also increased in
the Palos Verdes neighborhood. Because incidents were often not reported to the police
in the past, the calls for service data, therefore, may not provide a representative count of
the incidents that occurred prior to the intervention so a more definitive assessment of the
crime rate is not currently possible. Instead, given that calls for service can be described
as a measure of the residents’ reporting behavior (Warner & Pierce, 1993), these
increases may indicate that the residents have become more willing to report incidents to
the police since the intervention began. Further, the police lieutenant involved in the
Palos Verdes project stated that the increase in calls for service is both a successful
outcome of the intervention and an indication that “good police work” was being done in
the neighborhood (R. DuVall, personal communication, March 15, 2013).
Though the results of the analyses provide some insight into the impact of team
policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the police lieutenant felt that the intervention
has had a much broader impact than what the calls for service data can measure. For
example, he indicated that officers now feel welcome in the neighborhood and, in his
opinion, the trash and graffiti cleanup events, the CMART inspections, and the Palos
Verdes Pride event had the most effect on both bringing the residents together as a
community and changing their attitudes toward the police (R. DuVall, personal
communication, March 15, 2013).
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In addition to evaluating the impact of team policing in the Palos Verdes
neighborhood, this study also considered the possibility that the intervention could
displace crime to nearby areas. Though calls for service increased in the Palos Verdes
neighborhood, the catchment area did not experience any significant changes in calls for
service as a result of the team policing intervention. While this suggests that a diffusion
of crime control benefits did not occur during the intervention period, it also suggests that
crime displacement did not occur either.
Among the other comparison areas, only Control Area 3 experienced significant
changes in calls for service that could not be attributed to either seasonal fluctuations in
numbers of calls for service or the presence of a police intervention. However, according
to an Area Command Information Officer in the Downtown Area Command, the calls for
service decreases in Control Area 3 may have been the result of changes in management
strategies at the properties where incidents of crime and disorder frequently occurred (G.
Jackson, personal communication, March 22, 2013).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study has several limitations that restrict the interpretations that can be made
regarding the impact of team policing in the Palos Verdes neighborhood. First, as is the
case with many police interventions, the team policing project was developed specifically
to address the needs of the Palos Verdes neighborhood so random assignment was not
possible. As such, the control areas are non-equivalent to the Palos Verdes neighborhood
and it is possible that the differences between these areas, other than the exposure to the
team policing intervention, were responsible for the differences observed in the analyses.
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Second, this study evaluated the immediate impact of team policing using calls
for service data. Previous studies have cautioned against this type of comparison because
resident reporting bias has the greatest effect on calls for service data during the
intervention period (Braga et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 2011; Weisburd & Green, 1995). In
other words, being aware of a police intervention may cause residents to be more
sensitive to incidents of crime and disorder and more likely to report these incidents to
the police. As a consequence, the impact measured during the intervention period may be
greater than the long-term impact of the intervention (Weisburd & Green, 1995).
Therefore, future studies should evaluate the effects of an intervention over a longer
period when using calls for service data in order to more adequately assess the impact of
team policing.
Third, because calls for service data are limited in their ability to measure rates of
crime and disorder, future studies should also include in their analyses alternate data
sources such as incident reports, arrest reports, and clearance rates. Including data
sources such as these would allow for more definitive conclusions about the effectiveness
of team policing as a crime control strategy.
Finally, as the comments from the police lieutenant suggest, evaluating team
policing solely through quantitative data analyses provides only partial insight into its
impact. Future studies should incorporate more qualitative data analyses in the form of
surveys and interviews in order to evaluate the impact of team policing on the perceptions
and attitudes of the residents and officers involved in the team policing intervention.
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Implications for the Future of Team Policing
Team policing failed to become a policing standard during the 1970s because it
was often considered a short-term special project rather than a lasting policing strategy.
In order to succeed, team policing requires ongoing support from the rest of police
department. Unlike many previous team policing efforts, the Community Crimes Team
had much support from the captain of the Convention Center Area Command and the
lieutenant in charge of the Palos Verdes project. However, due to the reorganization of
the Convention Center Area Command in February 2013, the Palos Verdes neighborhood
is no longer under its jurisdiction and several of the Community Crimes Team officers
have received new assignments. Because the team policing intervention has had a
demonstrated impact on the Palos Verdes neighborhood, the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department may want to consider sustaining the project for a longer period.
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APPENDIX A
LVMPD CALLS FOR SERVICE
Calls for Service by Offense Category
Category

Code

Offense

407
407G
407Z
413
413A
413B
413G
415
415A
415B
415C
415D
415G
415Z
420
420G
420Z
426
426Z
434
434G

Robbery
Robbery (gang-related)
Robbery (attempted)
Person with a gun
Person with a knife
Person with other deadly weapon
Person with a gun (gang-related)
Assault and battery
Assault and battery with a gun
Assault and battery with other deadly weapon
Assault and battery (negative injury)
Assault and battery (domestic violence)
Assault and battery (gang-related)
Assault and battery (attempted)
Homicide
Homicide (gang-related)
Homicide (attempted)
Sexual assault
Sexual assault (attempted)
Illegal shooting
Illegal shooting (gang-related)

406
406V
406Z
411
411Z

Burglary
Auto burglary
Burglary (attempted)
Stolen motor vehicle
Stolen motor vehicle (attempted)

403
408
410
416
416A
416B
416F

Prowler
Drunk
Reckless driver
Fight
Juvenile disturbance
Other disturbance
Fireworks call

Violent

Property

Disorder

(table continues)
41

(table continued)
Category

Code

Offense

416G
416S
416V
425
425A
425B
425G
425H
440
441
441G
441V
441Z
446

Fight (gang-related)
Fight (school-related)
Fight (vice-related)
Suspicious situation
Suspicious person
Suspicious vehicle
Suspicious person (gang-related)
Anthrax threats
Wanted suspect
Malicious destruction of property
Malicious destruction of property (gang-related)
Malicious destruction of property (vice-related)
Malicious destruction of property (attempted)
Narcotics
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APPENDIX B
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE CONTROL AREAS
The first control area is located in the Victor 5 sector/beat of the
he Northwest Area
Command and is shown
own in Figure 55.

Figure 5. Control Area 1

© Google

The second control area is located in the William 1 sector/beat of the Bolden Area
Command and is shown
wn in Figure 66.
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Figure 6. Control Area 2

© Google

The third control areaa is located in the Baker 4 sector/beat of the Downtown Area
Command and is shown in Figure 77.

Figure 7. Control Area 3

© Google
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APPENDIX C
COMPARISON AREA LOCATIONS

Palos Verdes Neighborhood
Catchment Area
Control Area 1
Control Area 2
Control Area 3
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APPENDIX D
LVMPD JURISDICTIONAL MAP

Palos Verdes / Catchment Area

Control Area 2

Control
ontrol Area 1

Control Area 3
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Figure 9. Total Calls for Service in the Catchment Area: July 1, 2011-December 31, 2012

CALLS FOR SERVICE TRENDS IN THE COMPARISON AREAS
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Figure 8. Total Calls for Service in the Palos Verdes Neighborhood: July 1, 2011-December 31, 2012
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Figure 10. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 1: July 1, 2011-December 31, 2012
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Figure 11. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 2: July 1, 2011-December 31, 2012
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Figure 12. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 3: July 1, 2011-December 31, 2012
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Figure 13. Total Calls for Service in the Palos Verdes Neighborhood, Previous Year:
Intervention
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Figure 14. Total Calls for Service in the Catchment Area, Previous Year: Intervention
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Figure 15. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 1, Previous Year: Intervention
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Figure 16. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 2, Previous Year: Intervention
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Figure 17. Total Calls for Service in Control Area 3, Previous Year: Intervention
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